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Kathryn Hochstetler
Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, UK
ABSTRACT
What kinds of national climate institutions can solve the governance challenges 
that the Paris Agreement devolves to them? This article identifies three stages 
of climate institutions in Brazil, a major emitter of greenhouse gases through 
deforestation that managed to reduce such emissions for nearly a decade. It 
shows that a narrow definition of climate institutions that seeks purpose-built 
state institutions fails to capture important dynamics there, and that such 
institutions have little direct impact on outcomes. In Brazil’s political landscape, 
national presidents exercise a decisive influence on their climate ambitions and 
capacities. However, positive and negative feedback loops also brought some 
effective climate action from the layering of climate purposes into existing 
institutions, as well as through non-traditional institutions like private govern-
ance arrangements for agriculture.
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Introduction
Strong national climate institutions are the foundation of the Paris 
Agreement, which asserts that there must be continuous advances in national 
ambitions and capacities to avoid catastrophic climate change (Jordan et al. 
2018, p. 7–8). Yet, there have been few empirical studies of the national 
climate institutions central to these aims. The articles in this special issue on 
the Varieties of Climate Governance use case studies of large greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emitters to analyze how they have organized themselves internally to 
address climate change and the outcomes of those institutional choices 
(Dubash 2021). The project stresses that workable climate institutions will 
not follow some simple institutional formula, but will arise out of national 
historical-institutional traditions and will succeed as they harness the poli-
tical economies that underlie those traditions.
Brazil, the focus of this article, offers an interesting viewpoint on this 
process of institutionalization, as it established institutions that successfully 
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controlled emissions there after 2005, but then subsequently pared that 
governance capacity back. Figure 1 documents the empirical puzzle of 
success and stagnation just outlined. It shows the domination of deforesta-
tion and land-use change in Brazil’s emissions profile and the steep drop in 
those emissions after 2005. Its GHG emissions were 2.2% of the global total 
in 2005, but only 1.4% in 2014. This was achieved by a reduction in annual 
emissions from 1940 to 1357 MtCO2e, across years of both economic growth 
and retraction (CAIT Climate Data Explorer 2017). Figure 1 also shows that 
emissions are now rising in all sectors.
How might Brazil’s climate institutions have contributed to these out-
comes? The question presumes an answer to a prior question: what is 
a climate institution? The introduction to this special issue accepts defini-
tional openness on this question, expecting that the case studies themselves 
will inductively delimit the domain (Dubash 2021). The domain is 
expected to include at least the state agencies deliberately created to deliver 
a habitable climate, so those are central to this article. However, Dubash 
also notes that institutions originally created for other purposes may 
contribute to positive climate outcomes by being repurposed or having 
climate responsibility layered on them (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). In 
addition, the broader literature on climate governance carries a more 
inclusive understanding of institutions, with concepts like polycentric 
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Figure 1. Brazilian greenhouse gas emissions (t CO2eq) by sector, 1990–2019.
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possibly originating among non-state actors (Jordan, et al 2018: 8–9; 
Ostrom 2010).
One conceptual contribution of the Brazilian case is that it underlines that 
a broad definition of climate institutions may be needed to capture those 
actors with direct relevance for decarbonization. While some purpose built 
climate institutions are created (and destroyed), pre-existing institutions 
carry much of the climate agenda through layering of new responsibilities 
on them. Conversely, governmental institutions that one would expect to be 
central to climate governance, like the Ministry of Environment, are side-
lined initially and turn against climate action in the most recent period. 
These arguments are developed in a section of the article that traces the 
historical evolution of Brazil’s climate institutions through three phases.
I follow the roles of three factors in this evolution, all ones that this special 
issue hypothesizes will be drivers of institutionalization: broader political 
institutions, bureaucratic configurations, and international influences. Calls 
for bringing the insights of historical institutionalism to the study of dec-
arbonization stress the institutional path dependencies that may come from 
the first two in particular (Lockwood et al. 2017, Roberts and Geels 2019). 
Even new climate institutions are not established from scratch, but are 
grounded in the political and bureaucratic patterns that exist. I sketch 
these durable patterns in the next section of the article. Existing institutions 
may also have climate responsibilities layered onto them, with the alternate 
possibilities that pre-climate institutional cultures might shape the approach 
to climate, or that the institutions may be transformed as climate tasks are 
taken on (Mahoney and Thelen 2009).
My analysis also highlights the important role of institutional and policy 
feedback loops in establishing the historical trajectories that unfold: positive 
feedback reinforces the institutions and the policies they enable, while 
negative feedback undermines them. Andrew Jordan and Elah Matt have 
suggested that the difference between positive and negative trajectories has to 
do with the policy instruments used. They expect that positive feedback is 
associated with instruments that provide benefits, especially for large groups. 
In contrast, negative feedback is associated with regulations which ‘(re-) 
allocate costs towards a small number of actors . . . ’ (Jordan and Matt 
2014, p. 230).
Finally, international influences add dynamism and may interrupt 
national trajectories, notably through the requirements international nego-
tiations make for climate action and the institutional models they favor 
(Frank et al. 2000). That influence can include the power of new framings 
to change the understanding of an issue or its normative valence (Jinnah 
2017). Dynamism may, of course, also reflect framing work done 
domestically.
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After showing how Brazilian climate institutions have evolved (climate 
institutions as dependent variable), the article asks how well they have 
addressed the challenges of effective climate governance (climate institutions 
as independent variable). In the first of those governance challenges, climate 
institutions must establish a scope equal to the scale of climate change’s many 
impacts on the economy and society (Jordan et al. 2018, Dubash 2021). Next, 
those institutions must be robust and transformative over time, dependably 
implementing earlier commitments while remaining flexible enough to 
advance in changing conditions (Levin et al. 2012). Finally, they should be 
responsive to the citizens whose long- and short-term interests they organize. 
Climate institutions are not only the outcomes of power struggles among 
unequal groups, but they also structure future struggles among them and 
even the landscape of participants (Lockwood et al. 2017, Roberts and Geels 
2019).
The methodology used is historical process tracing. The sources include 
many government documents and reports. The article also draws on twenty- 
five semi-structured, in-person interviews conducted with actors in the 
climate and energy fields in Brazil from 2012 to 2019 to complete the 
story. Interviewees were based in the Ministries of Environment and Mines 
and Energy, related industrial sectors, and NGOs. As ‘elite interviewees’, they 
were chosen for their individual expertise (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 
p. 673). Given the Bolsonaro government’s targeting of climate actors, cita-
tions are to publicly available materials where possible.
Political background
Brazil has been a presidential democracy since 1985. Its presidents have an 
unusual number of powers over institutions, including decree powers that 
allow them to temporarily do nearly anything, subject to eventual review by 
courts and the legislature (Pereira et al. 2008). One use has been to substan-
tially reorganize the federal bureaucracy, particularly at the start of presi-
dential terms. Thus, unlike countries where national bureaucracies sit 
unchanged for decades, Brazil has seen regular rearrangements 
(Hochstetler and Keck 2007, p. 38–39). Those bureaucracies once held 
some 50,000 political appointees; while that dropped to about 5000 in 
reforms in 2005 (Hochstetler and Keck 2007, p. 25–26), this still allows 
substantial political control over bureaucracies (Bersch et al. 2017). Strong 
budgetary powers allow presidents to not only initiate budget bills, but also 
impound spending even after budgets are passed (Pereira, et al. 2008: 25). 
This combination of powers means presidents have a great deal of power 
over not just the composition but also the functioning of national institu-
tions. To the extent that climate institutions are federal state agencies, they 
can be strongly shaped by individual presidents.
4 K. HOCHSTETLER
Brazilian democracy also features many political parties, with at least 
fourteen represented in the National Congress at all times post-transition, 
requiring political coalition-building (Pereira et al. 2008). The Civil House/ 
Chief of Staff (Casa Civil) is the actor in the presidency that oversees the 
government’s political management (Decree 4607/2003), and presidents use 
it to advance priority agendas. Building governing coalitions complicates 
presidential leadership, not only in passing legislation when that is required, 
but also because it includes distributing ministries to coalition partners who 
may have their own agendas (Bersch et al. 2017). As discussed in more detail 
below, one cross-partisan ‘ruralist’ block has been linked to the interests of 
Brazilian agriculture – the major driver of deforestation – and has been an 
influential check on presidents (e.g., Mueller 2018).
Associational life is rich and varied in Brazil, with many civil society and 
economic actors politically engaged, through both formal and informal 
routes (e.g., Hochstetler and Keck 2007, Mayka 2019, Araújo 2020). Some 
of the most important forms of climate governance in Brazil are organized by 
civil society organizations, on their own or with industry organizations, 
especially in the agricultural and forestry sectors (Thaler et al. 2019). While 
these are not institutions in the narrower sense, they build governing frame-
works that ‘make norms and rules within a specific domain’ (Ostrom 2010, 
p. 552) that could also be called climate institutions where they promote 
decarbonization.
Three stages of institutionalizing climate action
Stage 1: responding to international negotiations, 1990–2002
The early stages of Brazilian climate institutions were strongly responsive to 
international negotiations. The influence can be seen not only in the timing 
of the creation of two new institutions, but also in the international reporting 
and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) oversight tasks layered on an 
existing ministry.
After the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the centre-right Cardoso administration 
(1995–2002) asked the Ministry of Science and Technology to lead a new 
Inter-Ministerial Commission on Global Climate Change, created in 1999. In 
part through Brazil’s own diplomatic efforts, the Kyoto Protocol did not 
require developing countries to take climate action beyond reporting, but 
offered possible funds and technology transfers for doing so through the 
CDM (Hochstetler and Viola: 759). Those charges defined the Inter- 
Ministerial Commission’s roles. One of its key functions was to be Brazil’s 
Designated National Authority for the CDM. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology performed the reporting role, compiling Brazil’s official climate 
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change statistics and overseeing reports to the UNFCCC on Brazil’s emis-
sions and actions (e.g., Brazil, Federative Republic of 2016). It also hosted 
scientific researchers on climate.
The choice of the Ministry of Science and Technology to lead Brazil’s early 
climate initiatives reflected successive governments’ conviction that climate 
change was a foreign policy and technology issue, not an environmental one, 
for Brazil (Rodrigues 2015, Aamodt 2018). The association of climate change 
with the obligations of developed countries to act meant a corresponding 
separation of the climate issue from deforestation. The latter was recognized 
as a national environmental problem in its own right, but not for its link with 
climate change. These unusual early frames for climate action in Brazil were 
only effectively challenged once institutional protagonism moved to the 
Ministry of Environment.
The Cardoso administration created a second climate institution in 2000 
that followed the international mandate to consult with climate stakeholders. 
It was also influenced by the national tradition of participatory consultative 
councils (e.g., Mayka 2019). Long-time environmental leader Fábio 
Feldmann urged his co-partisan Cardoso to create a state-society institution 
that would build a wider conversation around climate change. He pushed it 
over the objections of the Ministries of Science and Technology and of 
Foreign Affairs, which saw little need for citizen participation (Rodrigues 
2015, p. 140). Formally led by the national president, the Brazilian Climate 
Change Forum was a site that aimed for parity in numbers between govern-
mental and non-governmental members. The Forum members were to both 
generate proposals on climate change for the government and respond to 
governmental proposals, sometimes even in the middle of active negotiations 
(e.g., Sirgado 2010).
Stage 2: the domestic politics of constructing climate institutions, 
2003–2010
During Stage 2, Brazil took important steps toward creating climate-relevant 
institutional capacity, following largely domestic processes. In the Ministry 
of Environment, new units and approaches after 2003 brought deforestation 
under control even before climate-focused initiatives took hold. They were 
followed by a detailed National Climate Plan in 2008 and a formal National 
Climate Law at the very end of 2009 (Law 12.187/2009). These set the most 
important explicitly climate-oriented institutions in place by the end of this 
stage.
The first steps toward these institutional outcomes came with a change of 
government to the leftist Workers Party in 2003. President Lula da Silva 
chose rubber tapper and Workers Party Senator Marina Silva as Minister of 
Environment, where she led Brazil’s first successful approaches to reduce 
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deforestation. Silva layered her programs into the existing ministry, whose 
capacity she built first with environmental activists and then a permanent 
career track (Abers and Oliveira 2015). They helped formulate the Action 
Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon 
(PPCDAm) in 2004,1 which studies show made major contributions toward 
reducing the annual deforestation rate by 76% from 2005 to 2012 (Assunção 
et al. 2015, Azevedo et al. 2017, p. 7653). Much of the PPCDAm drew on 
existing legislation, like that for designating conservation units, but Silva 
sought and gained a powerful ally in the Presidency’s Civil House to oversee 
a cross-ministerial working group that brought new institutional weight to 
their use (Oliveira 2016, p. 177ff). In addition, the existing tools were used 
more effectively because the Ministry of Environment was now able to 
produce and analyze much better data for planning and oversight 
(Schwarzman et al. 2012). Because it did not rely on large new initiatives, 
the PPCDAm could develop without immediate political notice.
The PPCDAm largely follows a command and control model. It desig-
nated large numbers of conservation units, many with sustainable use 
designs from extractive reserves to indigenous areas. The area under formal 
protection rose 67% from 2004 to 2012, totaling 47% of the entire 
Amazonian territory (Nepstad et al. 2014, p. 1118). The PPCDAm also 
introduced meaningful real-time oversight of deforestation, using satellite 
technologies and a new Forest Service (Schwarzman et al. 2012). The Critical 
Municipalities program was added in 2008, denying agricultural credit to the 
36 municipalities with the highest rates of deforestation (Oliveira 2016). João 
Paulo Capobianco, who helped develop many of these initiatives, argues that 
the suite of approaches and institutions together persuaded regional actors 
that the national state was really present for the first time, obliging 
compliance.2
Not surprisingly, these policies generated strong opposition from the 
‘ruralists’, a group that includes not just farmers but also those who are 
economically and culturally attached to the sector. Agriculture has structural 
economic power: from 2012–2019, agricultural sectoral growth was below 
the national growth rate only twice and as much as four times higher, always 
leading exports.3 Ruralists are the most powerful political bloc that chal-
lenges environmental institutions and programs (Aamodt 2018, Viola and 
Franchini 2018). After being caught off guard by the new approaches, more 
ruralists sought election to the National Congress in 2010 in order to defend 
their economic interests against the executive (Sauer 2019, p. 107). From 
holding 120 seats in the 2007–2010 legislature, they jumped to 160 after 2011 
(DIAP – Departamento Intersindical de Assessoria Parlamentar 2010, p. 39). 
They were then poised to better fight back against the deforestation – and 
thus climate – policies and institutions.
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It should be noted that not all ruralists fit this simple story of backlash. 
A modern, internationally-oriented subset of the ruralists had joined envir-
onmental NGOs in limiting deforestation through agreements that pre-
vented agricultural traders seeking European markets from exporting 
commodity products from land deforested in the Amazon after 2006/2008 
(soy) and 2009 (beef) (Gibbs et al. 2016, Thaler et al. 2019, p. 64). The Soy 
and Beef Moratoria are private, rather than public, institutions that became 
especially important in the third stage.
These public and private efforts to control forest clearing began targeting 
deforestation in its own right, as Brazil’s forests are constitutionally protected 
as national patrimony (Republic of Brazil 1988: Article 225). As noted, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology and the Foreign Ministry had long led 
a national consensus that deforestation was not a climate issue (Aamodt 
2018, Viola and Franchini 2018). But as global climate negotiations began to 
push for all countries to take climate action, first Silva and then other parts of 
the Brazilian government began to listen to the environmental activists who 
wanted to link the topics in order to strengthen both and to seek interna-
tional financial support for forest protectors (Rodrigues 2015). The Ministry 
of Environment’s unexpected success in taming deforestation hastened this 
framing shift. The Civil House was tasked with leading 16 ministries in a new 
Inter-Ministerial Committee that could coordinate these efforts to develop 
a national plan for climate action (Decree 6.263/2007).
Conjunctural political considerations and shifting coalitions of interests 
were in the background (Viola and Franchini 2018). The year 2007 was the 
first year of Lula’s second term, requiring negotiations with Silva about her 
continuing role and setting off the beginning of a succession battle that 
eventually saw her as a 2010 presidential candidate challenging Lula’s chosen 
candidate, Dilma Rousseff (Oliveira 2016). As that presidential race 
approached, all the major parties sent their candidates to the Copenhagen 
negotiation and competed to promote an issue with broad popular support 
that Silva would otherwise claim (Hochstetler and Viola 2012).
In this context, a detailed National Plan on Climate Change emerged in 
November 2008, which included a primarily sectoral approach that singled 
out energy, forests, and agriculture for special treatment (Comitê 
Interministerial sobre Mudança do Clima 2008). It layered climate directives 
on existing institutions, listing 15 ministries with a role (ibid: 127). Much of 
the Plan, drafted by the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change, is about taking 
credit for Brazil’s pre-existing actions that had already reduced its emissions: 
its history of low-carbon hydroelectric power and the recent policies that 
controlled deforestation (ibid: 8). The Plan called for creating tax and fiscal 
incentives for climate-friendly private activities, and the Finance Ministry 
began examining the possibility of a carbon market in 2008 (Melo and Silva 
2018, p. 364).
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When the implementing regulation came a year later, the executive had 
included five sectoral programs of action, in two biomes, agriculture, energy, 
and steel, but did not advance the carbon market, which divided the Workers 
Party government (Decree 7390/2010).4 The first four sectoral programs 
were assigned to the Ministries of Environment, Agriculture, and Mines 
and Energy, and proceeded to implementation in Stage 3. The steel program 
was part of Lula’s 2008 industrial policy program, the Policy for Productive 
Development, (Hochstetler and Montero 2013, p. 1488) and neither out-
lasted his end of term in 2010.
The basic organization of Brazilian climate policy thus invokes specific 
sectoral targets and the primary implementing institutions are the national 
ministries responsible for them. The 2007 Inter-Ministerial Committee had 
coordinating responsibilities, with assistance from the continuing Inter- 
Ministerial Commission and Brazilian Climate Forum in their previous 
roles. Major protagonism remained with the existing ministries, however, 
layering climate responsibilities onto institutions designed for other 
purposes.
Stage 3: institutional and political disarray, 2011–2021
After this burst of institution building and re-purposing, the third and final 
stage of Brazilian climate institutions has mostly involved steps backward. 
The primary dynamics came from the area of agriculture and deforestation, 
tracking a backlash from ruralists as they gained political strength until 
electing one of their own, Jair Bolsonaro, to the presidency in 2018. 
Presidents Rousseff (2011–2016) and Temer (2016–2018) had already 
allowed attrition of many climate institutions through declining budgets 
and political commitment. President Bolsonaro went further, using provi-
sional decrees to directly undermine the climate-focused institutions under 
his control. Yet even then, other institutions – non-state or not historically 
climate-focused – have managed some sectoral advances for resisting the 
backlash.
Before turning to the major developments in the agriculture/deforestation 
nexus, the energy sector deserves a brief look, as its developments are mostly 
independent.5 Emissions in the energy sector have been historically low in 
Brazil because of its reliance on hydropower and its early adoption of 
biofuels. The 2010 regulations gave institutional responsibility for climate 
action in the energy sector to the Ministry of Mines and Energy and 
identified its annual energy planning document as the implementing tool. 
After the National Climate Law passed in 2009, the Ministry began to 
formally acknowledge Brazil’s international commitments on GHG emis-
sions in its optimization planning models (e.g., Ministério de Minas 
e Energia 2011, p. 283).6 Yet, at the urging of the Ministry and the industry, 
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Lula had used a line-item veto to excise a clause in the National Climate Law 
that called for phasing out fossil fuels.7 The annual planning documents are 
contradictory as a result, promoting low carbon in the electricity sector while 
omitting discussions of carbon in Brazil’s growing oil and gas sector (Viola 
and Franchini 2018, Hochstetler 2021). The plans have also done little to 
address Brazil’s fastest growing energy emissions, in heavy transport.8 
Designating the Ministry as a climate institution has thus done little to 
change its direction.
The developments in agriculture and deforestation have been more 
dynamic. As Rousseff took office, the Ministry of Agriculture continued to 
develop its own climate program, the Low Carbon Agriculture Plan (ABC 
Plan). It held more than 30 meetings with participants from ministries, the 
agricultural research agency Embrapa, unions, agricultural groups, and 
environmentalists (Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento 
2012, p. 17–18). The ABC Plan stresses resources for technological innova-
tion that will reduce GHG emissions, limiting deforestation by increasing 
productivity on existing agricultural lands, a land-sparing strategy (Manzatto 
et al. 2020, p. 8). Restoration of degraded pastures and no-till farming have 
accounted for about three-quarters of the contracts, hectares, and financial 
value of the roughly US$ 3 billion (BR$ 12.46 billion) financed between 2012 
and 2018 (ibid: 9). The ABC Plan is notably oriented to providing benefits 
and incentives.
At the same time, President Rousseff and her vice president and successor 
Michel Temer struggled to control the National Congress, dominated after 
2011 by ruralists and their allies, albeit with some pushback from an envir-
onmental caucus (Araújo 2020). The ruralist caucus pushed through 
a revised Forest Code in 2012 that weakened controls on deforestation 
(Mueller 2018). Ruralists had paid little attention to the Forest Code (dating 
to the 1930s), but once it began to be seriously applied in the 2000s, they 
pushed back hard (McDermott et al. 2015, Schwarzman et al. 2012, p. 342). 
They gained legally looser restrictions on deforestation on private land and 
amnesty for past violations (Mueller 2018). At the same time, the Forest 
Code also developed new policies for land demarcation that enhanced both 
the command and control and the market-based initiatives (Thaler, et al. 
2019).
Rousseff faced serious headwinds outside Congress as well, in large protest 
movements in 2013, a wide-ranging corruption scandal, and economic 
recession (Melo 2016). These brought much of ordinary governing activity 
and activism to a stop.9 Fighting for her political life even after being 
narrowly re-elected in 2014, she sought political allies by leaving environ-
mental regulations unenforced, undermining the environmental institutions 
by cutting their budgets and routinely declining to collect fines.10 Even so, 
Rousseff was controversially impeached with the support of the ruralists in 
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2016 (Rochedo et al. 2018). Her replacement, Michel Temer, suffered from 
similar political weaknesses and made similar trade-offs. The Temer govern-
ment kept the support of ruralists by signing legislative projects and provi-
sional decrees that reduced the size of some protected areas and allowed land 
claims of up to 2500 hectares without verification that the land was not 
already occupied (Rochedo et al. 2018, p. 695). Neither Rousseff nor Temer 
made significant changes in the formal climate institutions themselves, but 
their policy and fiscal choices repeatedly weakened the Ministry of 
Environment and its programs to control deforestation, quickly reflected 
by annual deforestation rates that now began to rise.
Despite these setbacks, agribusiness was not unified in its approach to 
deforestation and thus decarbonization. Brazilian agriculture is highly 
inequitable, as fewer than one percent of farms produce more than half of 
all farm income, while 66% produce 3.27% (Mueller 2018, p. 342). Half of all 
deforestation from 2004–2011 was on large properties over 500 hectares, but 
those were also where deforestation dropped mostly quickly, down 63% over 
the same years. In contrast, deforestation on small and remote holdings had 
risen 69 and 88%, respectively (Godar et al. 2014, p. 15,591). Economic crisis 
after 2014 brought new pressures on these actors to deforest land. Yet, both 
state policies and the market incentives have targeted the large properties, 
where oversight is easier and less politically fraught (Godar et al. 2014, 
p. 15,594).
If the large properties receive more oversight, they also receive far more of 
the positive incentives for controlling deforestation. The state policies that 
reward intensification of cultivation in the ABC Plan, for example, are largely 
‘limited to favorable soils with good road access, in areas already under elite 
control’ (Thaler et al. 2019, p. 67). Both the state and market-based policies 
depend on identifying the boundaries of agricultural land ownership pre-
cisely. Yet, the newly strong legal framework for land demarcation is too 
demanding for many small producers, especially in the Amazon, and their 
illegality then keeps them from being able to benefit from trade-based 
initiatives (McDermott et al. 2015, p. 138). To the extent that the new 
agricultural and deforestation policies reach small farmers, it will be the 
punitive side of them. Local communities have lost access to land and 
water with the soy market initiatives (Schilling-Vaca-Flor et al. 2021).
Market exclusion models like the Soy and Beef Moratoria offer the benefit 
of market access to agriculturalists who meet their requirements, starting 
with legal land demarcation. The agreements to have zero-deforestation in 
the Brazilian Amazon did measurably change the behavior of ranchers and 
meatpackers there. Property registration rose quickly for those who hoped to 
participate. In 2014, only four percent of supplying properties to slaughter-
houses had recently deforested land, while 36% had in 2009. Supplying 
properties also had lower deforestation rates (Gibbs et al. 2016, p. 36–38). 
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For soybeans, the agreement also reduced rates of deforestation for soy 
cultivation in the Amazon, but did so by pushing it to the Cerrado region 
(Lima et al. 2019, Schilling-Vaca-Flor et al. 2021). While far from classic 
climate institutions, the Soy and Beef Moratoria are arguably part of 
a broader polycentric understanding of climate institutions, and helped to 
compensate for the declining state role.
Under Temer, the Ministry of Agriculture institutionalized coordination 
with such non-governmental initiatives. A new Sustainable Development 
Commission for Agribusiness did not mention climate change or even the 
ABC Plan in its mandate, but it laid out general areas of action in sustainable 
development and nodded to working with related civil society organizations 
(Portaria 171/2016). In 2017, the ABC Plan gained its own inter-ministerial 
governance structure for monitoring GHG emissions, with planned links to 
non-state actors (Portaria 2277/2017). Temer’s Minister of Agriculture, the 
billionaire agribusiness leader Blairo Maggi, had been active in developing 
the Soy Moratorium through his Bunge commodity trading company and 
supported market-oriented initiatives to block deforestation (Rausch and 
Gibbs 2016, p. 2).
The Climate Forum also revived during Temer’s short government. 
Rousseff had de-emphasized this institution, and did not have it help write 
Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for Paris (Observatório 
do Clima N.d.). After 2016, a coalition of 60 of Brazil’s largest businesses, 
including agribusinesses, joined together to re-form the Business Council on 
Sustainable Development (CEBDS) and then, with NGOs, helped to reacti-
vate the Forum (Hochstetler 2021). In 2017 and 2018, more than 500 people 
participated in the Forum’s working groups that led to a first proposal for 
how to implement Brazil’s NDC, following the sectoral format already in 
place but also urging development of a carbon tax (Fórum Brasileiro de 
Mudança do Clima 2018a). Simultaneously, the Forum’s Working Group on 
Long-term Vision drew together analyses of how Brazil could reach net 
carbon zero by 2060 (Fórum Brasileiro de Mudança do Clima 2018b). 
When incoming President Bolsonaro threatened to leave the Paris 
Agreement, more than 130 organizations participated in the Forum’s dis-
cussion of future directions in agriculture for Brazilian climate policy to 
show their ongoing commitment to climate action (Coalizão Brasil: Clima, 
Florestas e Agricultura 2018).11
The Bolsonaro administration, which began at the start of 2019, has tied 
climate action to partisanship for the first time in Brazil, so that anti-Petismo 
(opposition to the Workers Party) now includes climate skepticism.12 
Bolsonaro’s rhetoric targets indigenous peoples and environmental civil 
society as opponents of its economic development agenda in the Amazon 
(Ferrante and Fearnside 2019).13 His administration immediately began 
a systematic assault on climate and environmental institutions on entering 
12 K. HOCHSTETLER
office, doing so mostly through decrees because of residual environmental 
power in the legislature (Araújo 2020, p. 4). Bolsonaro had proposed making 
the Ministry of Environment a branch of the Ministry of Agriculture before 
taking office, a breath-taking proposal to reduce climate capacity, but con-
gressional and societal pressure stopped this (Araújo 2020, p. 5–6, Vale et al. 
2021).
Even so, climate agencies inside the Ministries of Environment and of 
Foreign Relations were simply cut in early 2019 (Decree 870/2019), followed 
by the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Climate Change (Decree 9759/ 
2019). Climate bureaucracies now need some detection to find. The 
Ministry of Agriculture handles climate change in its Secretariat for 
Innovation, Rural Development, and Irrigation, while climate change is the 
‘Environment II’ agenda in the Foreign Ministry and has lost its links from 
the landing page. Near the end of Bolsonaro’s first year, he cut the Forum 
from the Inter-Ministerial Committee (Decree 10,145/2019). Forum presi-
dent Alfredo Sirkis was forced to step down in May of 2019 just before the 
long-term vision was released.14 The new Inter-Ministerial Committee had 
met just twice by mid-2021 and did not take up the Forum’s proposals (Casa 
Civil 2021).
Bolsonaro’s Minister of Environment openly advocated using the 
COVID-19 pandemic as a shield to hide quick dismantling of his 
Ministry’s capacity; scholars have found that the administration has issued 
57 major regulatory changes to reduce environmental protection (Vale et al. 
2021, p. 2). Opposition parties brought court cases in 2020 asking why the 
resources of the National Climate Fund and Amazon Fund had gone largely 
unspent since Bolsonaro’s arrival (Supremo Tribunal Federal 2020). The 
Bolsonaro government had targeted the Amazon Fund in particular because 
it included civil society groups on its board and gave them funds (Araújo 
2020, p. 16–17). Thus, through deregulation and budget cuts, formal climate 
institutions have seriously decayed even where they still exist.
In this context, meaningful climate action in the Bolsonaro years has 
mostly not come from the formal state institutions devoted to climate or 
even environmental ends. The Forum has continued to discuss important 
issues, including Brazil’s long-term energy plan, the possibility of declaring 
a climate emergency, and more.15 Yet, its influence is unclear. The Forum’s 
discussion of Brazil’s NDC ambition hit the limits of the Bolsonaro admin-
istration’s approach, for example, as the representative of the Ministry of 
Environment just repeated the government’s talking points about the histor-
ical responsibility of developed states versus Brazil’s own historic achieve-
ments, stressing that the government spoke for all Brazilians rather than the 
‘intellectual elites’ who might want more ambition from Brazil. In return, 
civil society actors have continued to be scathing in their critiques of the 
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government’s lack of ambition in its second NDC (Observatório do Clima 
2021).
Agribusiness is a partial, if incipient, institutional replacement. Under 
Bolsonaro’s Minister of Agriculture, Tereza Cristina Corrêa da Costa Dias, 
the Sustainable Development Commission was relaunched to handle a wider 
set of projects (Portaria 34/2019). The new version states that the Ministry will 
be a protagonist on sustainability issues despite its completely different his-
torical mission. The Ministry’s climate protagonism was most evident in its 
plans for the second decade of the ABC Plan, which gained new institutions in 
the form of a Technical Committee and a new monitoring structure (Decree 
10,606/2021). They would help the ABC Plan to lead in areas not historically 
attributed to the Ministry of Agriculture, like the development of carbon 
markets and the techniques of monitoring, reporting and verification, lan-
guage adopted directly from the international climate regime (Ministério da 
Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento 2021). These ambitious plans sit unea-
sily with the clear rise in deforestation that is visible in Figure 1. In addition, 
the Ministry of Economy, while continuing studies of carbon pricing with the 
World Bank, has made no commitments (Projeto PMR Brasil 2020).
In its initiatives, the Ministry is supporting the large agribusiness actors 
who have access to the positive incentives associated with decarbonization 
and have helped to create the non-governmental institutions (Rausch and 
Gibbs 2016). They are increasingly divided, however, between the traders 
and processors who directly interact with the European markets for defor-
estation-free Brazilian agricultural products and the producers who sell to 
them. The producers have become increasingly vocal during the Bolsonaro 
government, framing the Moratoria as illegitimate international violations of 
their rights in the Brazilian Forest Code to clear 20% or more of their land for 
agriculture, a position the Minister of Agriculture supported (Rodrigues 
2019). In contrast, the traders and processers – and some large producers – 
express an increasingly confident discourse about their ability to use envir-
onmental credentialing as a strategy for opening and maintaining valuable 
markets. In an extended interview with the business newspaper Valor 
Econômico, Marcelo Brito, the president of the Brazilian Agribusiness 
Association, acknowledged in 2019 that conservation is costly and requires 
compensation, but stressed the role of high-technology, high-productivity, 
legal agriculture in assuring that the sector is not environmentally destructive 
(Chiaretti 2019). Just 2% of all properties are said to contribute as much as 
62% of the illegal deforestation (Rajao et al. 2020, p. 246), supporting the 
argument that the sector does not need to be destructive.
The next section turns from these mixed historical observations to the 
questions in the introduction about whether Brazilian climate institutions 
meet the challenges of climate governance, drawing on the evidence and 
sources just surveyed.
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Synthesis: Brazilian climate institutions in form and function
Brazilian purpose-built climate institutions have shown considerable con-
tinuity of organizational form. Both the Inter-ministerial Commission of 
1999 and the Inter-ministerial Committee that largely replaced it in 2007 are 
aggregations of ministries related to climate change. The more powerful 
Committee is under the control of the presidency’s Civil House, which 
means that presidential priorities and favored ministries hold particular 
weight. In both the Commission and the Committee, the implementing 
institutions are long-standing ministries with many long-standing tasks 
while the aggregations are the only institutions designed to take on specific 
climate tasks. Those were set by a combination of international agreements 
and changing national framings of the climate issue.
The Inter-ministerial Commission was located within the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, and its view that foreign policy and technology 
development should dominate Brazilian climate action drove the 
Commission’s focus on the CDM and international reporting (Aamodt 
2018). The Inter-ministerial Committee, in contrast, was oriented to climate 
change as an environmental issue, including deforestation, with the biome 
protection programs of the Ministry of Environment at the heart of Brazil’s 
mitigation action and the Ministry coordinating the Committee’s Executive 
Group. This reflected a reframing of deforestation as a climate issue and of 
climate action as a top domestic agenda item (Rodrigues 2015), further 
embodied in the leading role of the Civil House.
In addition to the ministry-based institutions, non-state actors had two 
major institutions that allowed their participation. The first was the Brazilian 
Forum on Climate Change, formed in 2000 to allow state and society actors 
to debate climate issues together. Like other state-society councils in Brazil, it 
provides a deliberative space to mediate interests and develop ideas, even to 
draft new legislation and plans. The Forum may be an unusual climate 
institution in global perspective, but it is a very typical institution in Brazil, 
where dozens of such councils existed at the federal level until the Bolsonaro 
government began to dismantle them (Mayka 2019). The Forum’s role has 
varied according to the attention of the president in office, but it blossomed 
both in Lula’s ambitious presidencies and under the very weak Temer, under 
whom it filled governance gaps. The Forum has been an important site for 
debates on critical climate governance issues, even if it ultimately can only 
recommend actions for others to take up. The Forum is also linked through 
shared membership to a second non-state climate institution, the private 
governance arrangements for deforestation-free trade in soy and beef. While 
these are not climate institutions as narrowly defined, they are part of a wider 
polycentric climate governance system (Jordan et al. 2018).
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This institutional patterning provides an interesting lens on the climate 
governance challenges laid out in the introduction to the special issue. The 
first, the challenge of coordinating climate action in many sectors, is less 
relevant for Brazil because of the heavy dominance of deforestation in 
Brazil’s historic GHG emissions profile. It could make good progress on 
reducing its emissions by focusing there, even as other sectors did much less. 
The close focus on deforestation meant that the battle between actors who 
favored and opposed deforestation dominated the broader political economy 
of climate action, allowing even rapidly expanding oil and gas producers to 
largely escape attention from climate institutions (Hochstetler 2021, p. 70, 
Viola and Franchini 2018).
The institutional package – an inter-ministerial format with significant 
participation from business and civil society and accountability to a powerful 
presidency – has the potential to take on ambitious action, the second 
governance requirement. In key moments, everyone was in the room: in 
meetings of the Inter-Ministerial Committee and in initiatives of the Forum 
on Climate Change. From 2005 to 2009, all of those actors pushed each other 
to ambitious designs and achievements in the climate area, building on the 
close, if tense, relationship between Lula and Marina Silva and the political 
ambitions of both (Oliveira 2016). Outside of the main arena of controlling 
deforestation, powerful ministries like the Ministry of Finance (Melo and 
Silva 2018) and the Ministry of Mines and Energy (Hochstetler 2021) 
pursued some gains in their own domains. Without strong leadership from 
the top, however, this institutional package lacks transformative power and 
at best can hold a stalemate with anti-transition forces. The Forum resurged 
after 2017, but its ambitious new proposals went nowhere without take-up 
from a strong executive. Similarly, the private governance arrangements for 
soy and beef provide some speedbumps to the Bolsonaro government’s 
desire to develop the Amazon rapidly, but deforestation is arcing up as 
many regional actors conclude the government will not stop them (Vale 
et al. 2021).
Turning to the mediating politics, the historical survey shows there are 
substantial negative and positive feedback loops at work in the politics of 
how Brazilian climate institutions have functioned over time. There is 
a conundrum here. The cost-imposing command and control tools were 
critical for reducing the rates of deforestation, but their very success at 
limiting private economic behavior also spurred political strategies that 
then helped to undermine those very tools and the institutions that sup-
ported them (Assunção et al. 2015, Azevedo et al. 2017). Conversely, benefit- 
granting market tools like the soy and beef moratoria created a set of 
agriculturalists who favored controls on deforestation, but even rhetorically 
committed actors also took advantage of loopholes (Gibbs et al. 2016, Lima 
et al. 2019) and state-based support is still developing.
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Conclusion
In the first decade of the 2000s, Brazil made significant gains in controlling 
its GHG emissions by reducing very high annual rates of deforestation. 
Looking at the institutions involved, the Brazilian experiences show that 
climate institutions do not need to be purpose-built. Significant decarboni-
zation came from layering climate-relevant initiatives into institutions that 
had historically done other things. An climate institutional model that 
coordinated existing ministries with new climate responsibilities thus could 
provide a foundation for meaningful climate action. At the same time, the 
success and ambition of such a model in the Brazilian political and economic 
context proved to depend on what powerful actors allowed.
Looking at the broader political economy, there was a conundrum in the 
fact that command and control institutions were very effective for reducing 
emissions from deforestation in Brazil, but then generated political backlash 
that readily rolled them back. Conversely, positive incentives from institu-
tions that provide market access or the ABC Plan’s technology supports have 
not, in the Brazilian case, been widely enough shared to counter the negative 
feedback loops or to produce transformative strategies. This interest struc-
ture eventually led to presidential leadership that undermined and then 
openly dismantled the effective institutions, using the broader political 
tools that allow a Brazilian president to quickly excise relevant roles and 
capacities.
These observations raise cautions about the likely success and longevity of 
any particular institutional design for climate outcomes there. In such con-
texts, scholars of polycentric governance structures are right to suggest that 
there is more resilience in having multiple kinds of institutions to guide 
climate action (Jordan et al. 2018, p. 6). When a national executive is either 
embattled or outright committed to economic growth at the expense of 
climate outcomes, the presence of institutions with a stronger grounding in 
society – the Forum on Climate Change, the Soy and Beef Moratoria – could 
give proponents of climate action an institutional home that could create 
some counter incentives and activities. International pressures could also 
provide key external checks and incentives, especially as they supported 
domestic actors to resist presidents who were hostile to climate action.
Notes
1. Interview with João Paulo Capobianco, former Secretary of Biodiversity and 
Forests in the Ministry of Environment, São Paulo, 2018.
2. Interview with Capobianco.
3. Calculated from data.worldbank.org, accessed January 2021.
4. Interview with Adriano Santhiago de Oliveira, Director, Department of 
Climate Change, Ministry of the Environment, Brasília, 2014.
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5. Interview with Oliveira; Interview with André Ferreira, Instituto de Energia 
e Meio Ambiente, São Paulo, 2018.




8. Interview with Ferreira.
9. Interview with Celso Knijnik, Director de Energia do PAC, Ministry of 
Planning, Brasília, 2018; Interview with representative of the Instituto 
Socioambiental, São Paulo, 2014 (conducted by Ricardo Tranjan for author).
10. Interview with Capobianco.
11. Interview with Capobianco.
12. Interview with Andre Nahur, Coordinator Climate Change and Energy, 
WWF, Brasilia, 2018.
13. Interview with Nahur; Interview with representative of Greenpeace, São Paulo, 
2018.
14. Private communication with former official of the Forum, London, 2019.
15. https://forumclimabrasil.org/2020-historico-de-atividades-do-fbmc/. This site 
includes YouTube links of multiple events, including the discussion of Brazil’s 
NDC.
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